Abstract. A multisignature scheme for specified group of verifiers needs a group of signers' cooperation to sign a message to a specified group of verifiers that must cooperate to check the signature's validity later. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a new multisignature scheme for specified group of verifiers. However, we find that Zhang et al.'s scheme cannot prevent a dishonest clerk of signing group from changing the signing message to another message of his choice while he is cooperating with the signers to produce a multisignature. Therefore, their scheme is insecure.
Introduction
A digital signature provides the functions of integration, authentication and nonrepudiation for a signing message. Under some ordinary situations, one signer is sufficient to generate a signature on some message. But under other situations, it may need a group of signers' participation to produce a signature on a message. Due to the existence of the above situations, Itakura et al. [1] proposed a new concept of digital signature scheme, called multisignature scheme, during which a group of signers must cooperate to produce a signature on a message and any verifier can check the multisignature's validity by using the signing group's public key. later, Laih et al. [2] proposed a new type of multisignature scheme that is used for a specified group of verifiers. It is different from a multisignature scheme in that only under the group of verifiers' cooperation could a multisignature be verified. Unfortunately, He [3] pointed out that Laih et al.'s scheme has the weakness that the clerk of verifying group can verify a multisignature by himself if he once receives a signature from the same signing group. Recently, Zhang et al. [4] proposed a new multisignature scheme for specified group of verifiers, and claimed that forging signatures in the proposed scheme is equivalent to forging Harn's signatures [5] .
In this paper, we show that Zhang et al.'s scheme has the following weakness: a dishonest clerk of signing group can change the signing message to an arbitrary one while he is cooperating with the signers to produce a multisignature.
In the next section, we briefly review Zhang et al.'s multisignature scheme for specified group of verifiers. In Section 3, we show the weakness in Zhang et al.'s scheme. Concluding remarks are made in Section 4.
Review of Zhang et al.'s Multisignature Scheme for
Specified Group of Verifiers [4] Zhang et al.'s multisignature scheme consists of three phases: key generation, multisignature generation, and multisignature verification.
Key generation phase:
In each group, there is a specified user, called clerk. The clerk U Sc of the signer's group is responsible for verifying all partial signatures signed by signers in G S and combining them into a multisignature. The clerk U V c of the verifier's group is responsible for assisting all verifiers in G V to verify the multisignature. The trusted center selects two large primes p and q such that q|p − 1, a generator g with order q in Z p and a public one-way hash function H(·). Each U Si ∈ G S selects his private key s i ∈ Z q and computes his public key 
Multisignature generation phase:
All signers in G S perform the following steps to generate the multisignature of a message m for the specified group G V of verifiers:
Step 1: Each U Si ∈ G S randomly selects an integer k i ∈ Z * q , computes
Step 2: After receiving all the (r i , r i ),
and broadcasts r to all signers in G S .
Step 3: Each U Si ∈ G S computes
and sends w i to U Sc .
Step 4: For each received w i , U Sc checks whether the following equation holds,
The multisignature of m is (r, w).

Multisignature verification phase:
All verifiers in G V perform the following step to verify the multisignature of message m:
Step 1:
and sends X j to U V c .
Step 2:
and broadcasts X to all verifiers in G V .
Step 3: Each U V j checks the validity of the multisignature of the message m by the following equation:
If it holds, then the verifier accepts the signature is valid; Rejects, otherwise.
Security of Zhang et al.'s Multisignature Scheme
The dishonest clerk U Sc can produce a valid multisignature on any messagē m while he is cooperating with the signers to produce a multisignature in the following way,
Step 1: After receiving all the (r i ,
and broadcastsr * to all signers in G S .
Step 2: Each U Si ∈ G S will computē
and sendw i to U Sc .
Step 3: For all thew i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), U Sc checks whether the following equation holds,
If all the above equalities hold, then U Sc computesw = n i=1w i − a mod q. The multisignature ofm is (r,w), sincē
Therefore, we havē
Thus, the following multisignature verification equation holds:
The weakness is mainly caused by the linear relationship between H(m) and r in Eqn. (1) . If Eqn. (1) is replaced with the equation w i = s i · H(m, r ) − k i mod q, then the clerk U Sc will not produce a multisignature on a message of his choice; Anyway, he can still change the parameter r to anotherr . Another way to improve Zhang et al.'s scheme is to broadcast r i to all the signers in G S except just sending (r i , r i ) to U Sc . Then, each signer computes r i and produce an individual signature w i . Furthermore, to prevent Li et al.'s attack [7] , the certificated authority should require each user to prove that he knows the secret key corresponding to his public key. The disadvantage is to increase the computational complexity and communication costs, but higher security will be achieved.
Concluding Remarks
We show that Zhang et al.'s scheme cannot prevent a dishonest clerk of signing group from changing the signing message to another message of his choice while he is cooperating with the signers to produce a multisignature.
